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Non-Technical Summary 
 
The public at large and especially central bank watchers, financial media and market participants 
pay considerable attention to central bankers’ statements. Every word is evaluated with regard to 
possible signals about future monetary policy decisions. In the academic literature, analysis of 
communication is a growing field of research but quantification of rhetoric signals is difficult and 
more or less prone to subjective judgement. In our analysis, we try to assess the informational 
content of the monthly press conferences for future interest rate decisions of the ECB. We suggest 
a more objective construction of a wording indicator. For this purpose our index construction is 
based on an algorithm which can be understood as representing a learning process of ECB 
observers. In this algorithm the relevant code words, their sign and their weight are chosen on the 
basis of statistical criteria exploiting different frequencies of code words’ appearance in neutral, 
expansionary or restrictive monetary policy phases. 
Our analysis is solely related to the link between communication and the likely future monetary 
path. To investigate this relation, we deal with two distinct but closely related questions: First, is 
central bank watching based on a counting of code words alone an efficient information technique 
in the sense that this strategy does not perform substantially worse than other more subtle 
techniques? And second, do wording indicators in addition to economic data offer valuable 
information for the explanation of central bank rates?  
In the empirical analysis, we employ a monetary reaction function extended by the wording 
indicator. Our results indicate that the decoding of rhetoric signals is useful because wording 
includes information helpful to improve the explanation of interest rate decision based on standard 
explanatory models. This result is confirmed on the basis of out of sample analysis where the 
period on which the wording indicator’s choice of weights is based is not included in testing this 
indicator’s significance. We conclude that ECB wording has an information content which cannot 
fully be replicated by Taylor type regressions. But simple decoding of central bankers’ messages 
cannot substitute a more thorough analysis of economic data. Our findings indicate that 
judgements based solely on analysing central bankers’ speeches are inferior to more refined 
approaches based on models and economic data. 
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Abstract  
 
In this analysis, the informational content of central bank rhetoric is assessed based on the 
experience with the ECB since 1999. Among the ECB’s communication channels we focus on the 
monthly press conferences. Based on a counting of certain signal words we construct a wording 
indicator reflecting the “hawkishness” of monetary rhetorics. For the construction, we develop an 
objective algorithm representing a learning process of ECB observers. We then integrate this 
indicator into a standard Taylor type ordered probit model for the explanation of the interest rate. 
We show that the wording indicator can improve the model’s fit when added to the standard 
explanatory variables. However, a model based solely on this indicator performs worse than the 
baseline. The results are confirmed by out of sample analysis where the determination of the 
wording indicators’ weights is based on the early ECB period which, subsequently, is excluded 
from the tests. Our conclusion is that linguistic analysis can improve but not substitute more 
rigorous forecasting techniques based on hard economic data. 
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1 Introduction 
Central bank watchers, financial media and market participants pay considerable attention to 
central bankers’ statements. Even slight nuances of wording are being scrutinised with regard 
to possible signals about future monetary policy decisions. In the financial press, lists of code 
words are reported together with their alleged monetary policy interpretation (e.g., without 
author (2003)). Examples exist where the linguistic analysis of central bank publications is 
used to construct a measure of rhetoric “hawkishness” which then serves as an input for 
assessing the monetary policy outlook (Mayer, 2004). 
Practitioners’ attention to central bank wordings stands in contrast to academic approaches to 
explain and forecast central bank decisions. In the literature, approaches dominate which are 
based on objectively quantifiable economic data, e.g. in the context of specifying Taylor type 
rules. This self-restriction is related to technical difficulties of quantifying rhetoric signals. A 
further and more serious reason, however, might be the assumption that financial market 
actors form expectations on the basis of the full set of available economic data and that central 
bank rhetoric does not include any informational value added. If the latter assumption were 
true the watching of central bankers’ lips would have to be regarded as a forecasting 
technique being inferior to more technical approaches. 
In our analysis, we try to assess the informational content of central bank rhetoric for future 
central bank rates based on the experience with the ECB since 1999. Among the ECB’s 
communication channels we focus on the monthly press conferences. 
In essence, we deal with two distinct but closely related questions: First, is central bank 
watching based solely on a counting of code words an efficient information technique in the 
sense that this strategy does not perform substantially worse than other more subtle 
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techniques? And second, do wording indicators in addition to hard economic data offer 
valuable information for the explanation of central bank rates?  
Our results tend to negate the first question and to answer the second question in the 
affirmative. Although the simple decoding of central bankers’ messages cannot substitute a 
thorough analysis of economic data, our findings clearly support the rationality of central 
bank watchers’ attention for linguistic specificities. Obviously, ECB wording has an 
information content which cannot fully be replicated by Taylor type regressions. Thus, it is 
rational information collecting when market actors pay attention to the subtleties of wording. 
In the academic literature, there exist only a few studies testing for certain informational 
contents of ECB wording which are closely related to our work (Rosa and Verga, 2005; 
Gerlach, 2004). A common characteristic of these rare attempts, however, is a subjective 
construction of wording indices. This means that the authors’ own judgement guides the 
interpretation of certain formulation of ECB representatives and the sign and weights of code 
words in the overall indicator. We follow a different approach by suggesting a more objective 
construction of a wording indicator. For this purpose our index construction is based on an 
algorithm which can be understood as representing a learning process of ECB observers. In 
this algorithm the relevant code words, their sign and their weight are chosen on the basis of 
statistical criteria exploiting different frequencies of code words’ appearance in neutral, 
expansionary or restrictive monetary policy phases.   
This study is also related to other strands of research dealing with monetary predictability and 
the impact of central bank communication on financial markets. 
For example, the ECB has been surveyed regarding its transparency and communication 
policy. Ross (2002) examines the predictability of ECB policy decisions using the persistence 
of interest rate changes via the smoothing parameter included in the Taylor rule, federal funds 
futures to predict changes in the monetary policy of the Fed and the short-term end of a 
forward curve calculated by the Bank of England and the EONIA for the ECB. He concludes 
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that the predictability of the ECB is lower than that of the other two banks. On the other hand, 
Gaspar et al. (2001) come to the conclusion, that announcements of monetary policy decisions 
do not change the stochastic behaviour of the EONIA, which indicates that market 
participants have anticipated interest rate decisions. 
The bias announcement which had been practiced by the Fed is, of course, a very direct and 
explicit monetary signal which as such does not exist in the ECB’s context. This bias 
announcement includes significant information, which may help to predict the Federal 
Reserve’s interest rate decisions (Conley, Dupor and Mirzoev 2004). 
By concentrating on the press conference given to explain the interest rate decisions, we can 
ignore the finding of Jansen and De Haan (2004) that statements of central bankers on interest 
rates, inflation and economic growth have been different and even contradictory with respect 
to central banker from the ECB and the national central banks of the euro area. However, over 
time, the interest rate statements have become less contradictory. 
A further focus of related literature is the impact of announcements and communication on 
financial market variables like capital market rates or exchange rates. Andersson, Dillén and 
Selling (2001) find, that the long-term interest rates are influenced by signals from speeches 
of central bankers from the Swedish central bank. This influence might even be larger than 
unexpected changes in the official rate. Guthrie and Wright (2000) find a clear announcement 
effect for interest rates along all maturities in the case of New Zealand. Studies related to the 
impact of communication on exchange rates are Fratzscher (2004) and Jansen/de Haan 
(2004). 
Faust, Swanson und Wright (2004) find little evidence that monetary policy surprises from the 
Federal Reserve convey superior information that may be used to improve the private sector 
forecast of statistical releases. This is a finding interesting in our context since central bank 
private information could be one of the reasons for the informative value added of central 
bankers’ statements. 
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Summing up, the existing studies are of a more indirect nature compared to ours’. In many of 
these analyses, central bank announcements are seen to change market participants’ 
expectations of the future monetary stance with immediate consequences for the pricing of 
certain financial assets. Our analysis is more focused and solely related to the first step of the 
logical chain, the link between communication and the likely future monetary path. 
In the next section we give a brief exposition of our analytical strategy, followed by the 
construction of a wording index in section 3. Section 4 presents our central econometric test. 
Section 5 summarizes our findings and concludes. 
 
2 Analytical approach 
There are basically two different potential explanations for the markets’ attention to central 
bank wording. Our empirical strategy is designed to differentiate between both. 
First, information strategies based on the exegesis of central bank statements may be a cost-
efficient alternative to more rigorous approaches based on implicit or explicit models and a 
collection of all relevant data. The Fed’s former bias announcement illustrates this 
interpretation: If a central bank credibly states what it intends to do in the coming months, 
market participants could try to economize on forecasting efforts and – in the extreme – even 
stop devoting any resource to this activity apart from following official statements.  
The second explanation points towards a less demanding function of rhetoric signals. Even if 
these signals may not be able to replace more thorough forecasting techniques they might be 
useful to improve these forecasts. This should be the case if one of the following two 
conditions is fulfilled: The central bank has private information on data being relevant for 
future monetary decision or market actors are uncertain about the correct decision model. As 
cited above, for the Fed the study of Faust, Swanson und Wright (2004) does not support the 
existence of substantial private information but the situation could be different for Europe. 
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Furthermore, the relative short history of the ECB is a strong argument in favour of model 
uncertainty on the side of ECB watchers. For example, it may be unclear how (common 
knowledge) data on heterogeneous developments in the Euro zone affect the decision making 
in the Council (Heinemann and Hüfner, 2004).  In these cases, wording signals can be an 
input to forecasting models being able to improve the model’s fit. 
Our empirical strategy, consecutively, tests for both potential functions. I.e. we test the 
following two distinct hypotheses: 
 
 
Hypothesis 1: 
Central bank watching and de-coding of wording is a substitute for thorough model analyses. 
 
Hypothesis 2: 
Wording includes information helpful to improve the explanation of interest rate decisions 
based on standard explanatory models. 
 
In order to test hypothesis 1, we check the fit of a model explaining ECB rates solely on the 
basis of their own history and our wording indicator. Hypothesis 2 is tested by augmenting a 
standard Taylor equation with our wording indicator as additional regressor. 
Before proceeding with this strategy, in the following section, we describe the construction of 
our wording index. 
 
3 Learning and the construction of a wording index 
Our attempt to decode and quantify the ECB’s rhetoric messages starts by identifying possible 
signal words and further characteristics of communication policies. In order to base the 
analysis on a regular stream of communication signals we focus on ECB press conferences 
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which offer a monthly frequency and which are carefully analysed by ECB watchers. On the 
basis of these potential code words our construction of the wording index that can be 
interpreted as describing a simple learning process of ECB watchers. The learning process 
assumes that observers of monetary policy look for significant differences in the frequencies 
of potential code words in different monetary policy phases. Monetary phases are classified 
depending on the subsequent interest rate policies, i.e. whether the month of observation is 
preceding a two months period with rate cuts, rate increases and unchanged rates, 
respectively. Observing significant differences in frequencies among these monetary phases, 
subsequently allows ECB observers to draw conclusions from wording about future monetary 
decisions. 
A convincing test for the usefulness of any such learning process must rely on out of sample 
analysis. This means that the period of learning on the one hand and the period of testing the 
learning results’ usefulness on the other hand need to be non-overlapping. Therefore, we 
construct two variants of our wording indicators based on different periods in order to prepare 
for out of sample testing in the next section. 
Starting point is the identification of potential code words. Here we make use of lists 
circulating among practitioners (Without author, 2003) and as they are used in the related 
academic studies (Rosa and Verga, 2005). Table A in the appendix lists the code words 
included in our subsequent algorithm. We also include into our list a variable measuring the 
length of the President’s introductory statement. This communication characteristic could play 
a role assuming that preparing the ground for a change in interest rates might need more 
words compared to a situation of continuing passivity.  
In order to test these words’ informational content we count their use in the introductory 
statements in each monthly ECB press conferences. In those months where no press 
conference took place we take the editorials of the monthly ECB reports as substitute which 
are very similar in contents, length and terminology to the press conferences’ initial 
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statements. In order to safeguard a high degree of objectivity we abstain from taking into 
account the context of the terms’ use apart from unequivocal negations. For example, we do 
treat a statement like “there is no risk to price stability” as if “risk to price stability” was not 
mentioned. We then group observations into periods of neutrality, tightening and easing bias. 
Our grouping criterion is the observed interest policy of the two months following the press 
conference. 
Figure 1 shows frequency means of code words depending on the character of the monetary 
policy stance judged on the basis of the interest rate decision in the following two months. 
Press conferences preceding interest rate increases are characterized by a more frequent use of 
“vigilant”, “risks to price stability/inflation”, “second round effects” or “favourable outlook 
for growth”. Apart from that, statements are longer. During more passive stages the ECB 
president more frequently uses words like “appropriate”, “in line”, “consistent with price 
stability” or balanced. Code word used more frequently in phases preceding interest rate cuts 
are “to monitor”, “downside risks to growth” or “economic slowdown”.  
However, not all of these differences are significant. Tables 1 and 2 summarise the results of 
ANOVA tests for the equality of means in the frequency of these words’ frequencies for the 
period January 1999 – October 2003 which is the period of Wim Duisenberg being ECB 
president and for a two year sub-section of the Duisenberg era, respectively. 
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Figure 1: Frequency means of code words in press conferences depending on monetary policy phase (era Duisenberg 1999:01-2003:10) 
8 
 
 
9 
Table 1: Analysis of variance – Duisenberg era 
 F-statistic significance η2 
appropriate 2.54 0.087 0.082 
in line with price stability 1.03 0.364 0.035 
for the time being 0.59 0.559 0.020 
observe 3.64 0.032 0.113 
to monitor 1.97 0.149 0.065 
vigilant/vigilance 1.75 0.182 0.058 
risks to price stability 12.19 0.000 0.300 
upsiderisks to price stability 13.56 0.000 0.322 
downside risks to growth 9.16 0.000 0.243 
upside pressure on inflation 6.71 0.002 0.190 
downward pressure on growth 0.93 0.402 0.031 
second round effects 2.49 0.092 0.080 
appropriate action 1.68 0.195 0.056 
alert 1.68 0.195 0.056 
mixed signals 0.59 0.559 0.020 
favourable outlook for growth 29.28 0.000 0.507 
favourable outlook for price 
stability 3.19 0.049 0.101 
compatibe with price stability 1.96 0.150 0.064 
consistent with price stability 0.85 0.433 0.029 
balanced 1.51 0.229 0.050 
economic slowdown 3.35 0.042 0.105 
number of words 2.04 0.139 0.067 
January 1999-October 2003, 60 observations (two press conferences in March 2000 and June 2001). η2 is 
computed as between-groups sum of squares divided by total sum of squares. 
 
 
On the basis of a 10% significance level a number of potential signal words do not show 
significant differences in mean frequencies. Those code words are excluded from the 
following calculations. Exclusions differ between the total Duisenberg period and the sub-
period. The differences in the mean length of the statements miss significance and are 
dropped as well in both period definitions. 
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Table 2: Analysis of variance - restricted database 1999-2000 
 F-statistic significance η2 
appropriate 0.37 0.693 0.033 
in line with price stability 3.15 0.063 0.223 
for the time being - - - 
observe 0.81 0.459 0.068 
to monitor 3.42 0.051 0.237 
vigilant/vigilance 4.84 0.018 0.306 
risks to price stability 6.16 0.008 0.359 
upsiderisks to price stability 5.47 0.012 0.332 
downside risks to growth 58.08 0.000 0.841 
upside pressure on inflation 2.02 0.157 0.155 
downward pressure on growth 4.84 0.018 0.306 
second round effects 1.27 0.302 0.103 
appropriate action 0.37 0.693 0.033 
alert 0.37 0.693 0.033 
mixed signals 4.84 0.018 0.306 
favourable outlook for growth 6.87 0.005 0.385 
favourable outlook for price 
stability 2.64 0.093 0.194 
compatibe with price stability 0.81 0.459 0.068 
consistent with price stability 0.37 0.693 0.033 
balanced 2.13 0.143 0.162 
economic slowdown 9.51 0.001 0.464 
number of words 0.00 0.996 0.000 
January 1999-December 2000, 25 observations (two press conferences in March 2000). No use of “for the time 
being” in this period. 
 
Since the ANOVA assesses differences in mean across all groups it does not give a direct 
insight on pair-wise differences. For this purpose, for the words with significant F-tests we 
present least significant distance tests (Table 3 and Table 4) indicating which of the pair-wise 
differences in means show significance.  
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Table 3: Pair-wise differences in means (least significance distance) – Duisenberg era 
  difference 
in mean 
significance 
appropriate neutral vs. easing 0.11 0.466 
 tightening vs. easing -0.26 0.128 
 tightening vs. neutral** -0.37 0.028 
observe neutral vs. easing 0.00 1.000 
 tightening vs. easing** 0.14 0.020 
 tightening vs. neutral** 0.14 0.017 
risks to price stability neutral vs. easing 0.28 0.373 
 tightening vs. easing*** 1.69 0.000 
 tightening vs. neutral*** 1.41 0.000 
upside risks to price 
stability neutral vs. easing 0.12 0.628 
 tightening vs. easing*** 1.40 0.000 
 tightening vs. neutral*** 1.28 0.000 
downside risks to growth neutral vs. easing*** -0.60 0.001 
 tightening vs. easing*** -0.76 0.000 
 tightening vs. neutral -0.16 0.412 
upside pressure on 
inflation neutral vs. easing 0.51 0.104 
 tightening vs. easing*** 1.31 0.001 
 tightening vs. neutral** 0.80 0.024 
second round effects neutral vs. easing 0.02 0.820 
 tightening vs. easing** 0.26 0.043 
 tightening vs. neutral* 0.24 0.058 
favourable outlook for 
growth neutral vs. easing 0.01 0.961 
 tightening vs. easing*** 1.52 0.000 
 tightening vs. neutral*** 1.51 0.000 
favourable outlook for 
price stability neutral vs. easing 0.37 0.124 
 tightening vs. easing -0.29 0.307 
 tightening vs. neutral** -0.66 0.017 
economic slowdown neutral vs. easing* -0.32 0.078 
 tightening vs. easing** -0.52 0.016 
 tightening vs. neutral -0.20 0.330 
*/**/***: significance at 10%/5%/1% 
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Table 4: Pair-wise differences in means (least significance distance) - restricted database 
1999-2000 
  difference 
in mean 
significance 
in line with price stability neutral vs. easing 0.54 0.195 
 tightening vs. easing -0.12 0.758 
 tightening vs. neutral** -0.66 0.021 
to monitor neutral vs. easing** -1.50 0.020 
 tightening vs. easing** -1.36 0.025 
 tightening vs. neutral 0.14 0.719 
vigilant/vigilance neutral vs. easing 0.00 1.000 
 tightening vs. easing* 0.50 0.062 
 tightening vs. neutral** 0.50 0.010 
risks to price stability neutral vs. easing -0.50 0.522 
 tightening vs. easing 1.21 0.107 
 tightening vs. neutral*** 1.71 0.003 
upside risks to price 
stability neutral vs. easing 0.25 0.741 
 tightening vs. easing** 1.64 0.029 
 tightening vs. neutral*** 1.39 0.009 
downside risks to growth neutral vs. easing*** -2.00 0.000 
 tightening vs. easing*** -2.00 0.000 
 tightening vs. neutral 0.00 1.000 
downward pressure on 
growth neutral vs. easing** -0.33 0.010 
 tightening vs. easing*** -0.33 0.006 
 tightening vs. neutral 0.00 1.000 
mixed signals neutral vs. easing*** -0.33 0.010 
 tightening vs. easing*** -0.33 0.006 
 tightening vs. neutral 0.00 1.000 
favourable outlook for 
growth neutral vs. easing 0.50 0.434 
 tightening vs. easing*** 1.71 0.008 
 tightening vs. neutral*** 1.21 0.007 
favourable outlook for 
price stability neutral vs. easing -0.04 0.909 
 tightening vs. easing -0.52 0.137 
 tightening vs. neutral* -0.48 0.054 
economic slowdown neutral vs. easing*** -0.88 0.002 
 tightening vs. easing*** -1.00 0.000 
 tightening vs. neutral -0.13 0.444 
*/**/***: significance at 10%/5%/1% 
 
The significant pair-wise tests are used to decide the sign of the specific code word in our 
indicator. A positive sign is attributed to those words for which tests significantly show larger 
frequencies in tightening compared to easing periods, tightening compared to neutral periods 
or in neutral compared to easing periods. A negative sign is assigned to words where the 
significant relative frequencies are opposite. Thus, the resulting indicator is, by construction, 
positively associated with an increasing “hawkishness” of ECB rhetoric. 
Additional information for the learning oriented construction of our wording index comes 
from the η2 statistic (measuring the share of the total variance attributable to differences in 
means between the three different kinds of periods). η2 is used to provide a weight for the 
informational contents of different code-words. 
Summing up, our wording index WI is constructed using frequency of code words xi as 
follows: 
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The index adds for each period the (standardized) number of observations. These numbers are 
weighted by the η2 in order to account for the differences in the informational content of code 
words. The sign of each individual code word is determined on the basis of significant pair-
wise tests in Tables 3 and 4 as described. 
We calculate two indicators: First, WID which is based on the information from the complete 
Duisenberg period January 1999 until October 2003, and, second, WI9900, which only reflects 
a learning process from the first two years (1999-2000) of the Duisenberg era. The latter 
indicator is used in the next section for out of sample testing.  
Figure 2 presents the two resulting wording indicators together with the minimum bid rate on 
the main refinancing operations (MRO). While both indicator variants are highly correlated 
they show differences in behaviour in particular towards the end of the period covered. Since 
spring 2004, both indicators reveal increasing hawkishness of monetary rhetorics (not being 
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followed by monetary action) with the increase being more pronounced for WI9900 compared 
to WID. 
 
Figure 2: Wording Indicators and the Minimum Bid Rate on the MROs 
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4 Econometric analysis 
Starting point of our estimation model is a standard ordered probit setup where the Governing 
Council either increases or decreases the interest rate or leaves it unchanged depending on the 
divergence between the current target and the interest rate of the last period, . The 
ECB Council is modelled to decide on the basis of certain critical thresholds, μj, j=1,2. If the 
difference between the target and the actual interest rate last month falls below the lower 
threshold, we observe an interest rate cut. If the difference is large enough, the interest rate 
rises. Between the two thresholds an inactive zone is generated:  
1
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We assume that the target rate is defined on the basis of a smoothing adjustment towards 
which is the optimal rate of the fully specified model guiding the decision of the Council: Fti
 
(1)  * 1   (1- ) .
F
t ti i iρ ρ−= + t
 
A Taylor type interest rate is possibly an incomplete approximation of . We model this by 
regarding the fully specified model as a weighted average of a Taylor target rate  and a 
second target rate, , which includes those o
F
ti
T
ti
O
ti ther aspects in Council preferences which are 
not taken account of in the Taylor approach and for which central bank watchers hope to get 
information from wording analyses: 
 
(2)     (1 - ) .F Tt ti iη η= + Oti
 
Thus,  is our analytical reference point for which communication and signals become 
relevant. Only in the extreme case of the Taylor rule explaining the monetary world 
completely, both target interest rates are identical and the target rate of the fully specified 
model equals the Taylor interest rate. The intended interest rate  can be explained by the 
intended change of the interest rate, 
O
ti
O
ti
O
tiΔ , based on the interest rate of the last period, 
. Combining this with equations (1) and (2) we get: 1
O
t t ti i i−= + Δ O
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In regard to our econometric specification we now have to specify the Taylor equation. Here, 
we follow Gerlach (2004) and Rosa and Verga (2005) and use the inflation rate, π, the output 
gap, y , or a related measure, money growth, Δm, and the annual growth rate of the real 
effective exchange rate, Δe, as explanatory variables. Reflecting the availability of monthly 
data we generally use lagged values: 
 
(4) t-1 1 1 1          .
T
t t ti y mα βπ γ δ θ te− − −= + + + Δ + Δ  
 
Based on these considerations, the central bank would change the interest rate according to 
equation (5) which is the basis for our regressions: 
 
(5)  * *1 1 1 1 1 1(1 ) (1 ) ( ) (1 ) ,Ot t t t t t t t t ti i i i y m e iρ η ρ η α βπ γ δ θ η− − − − − −⎡ ⎤− = Δ = − − + − + + + Δ + Δ + − Δ +⎣ ⎦ ε  
 
where ε  denotes the error term. In the estimation, we add the lagged change of the interest 
rate as proposed in Judd and Rudebusch (1998) in order to account for the short run dynamics 
of the process. Consequently, our estimation model is the following: 
 
(6)  * 1 1 2 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 1 6
O
t t t t t t t ti a i a i a a y a m a e a i tπ ε− − − − − −Δ = + Δ + + + Δ + Δ + Δ +  
 
where denotes the change in the interest rate on the MRO. iΔ
The following data are used: Our interest rate i denotes the interest rate on the main 
refinancing operations (MRO) (Source: ECB). The yearly inflation rate π  is based on the 
harmonized index of consumer prices HICP (Source: Eurostat). The output gap y  is 
calculated as the difference in per cent between the seasonally adjusted index of industrial 
production including construction (Source: Eurostat) and the HP filtered series. Alternatively, 
the seasonally adjusted series of the economic sentiment indicator, published by the European 
Commission, is used in the form ((esi- esi )/ esi )*100, where esi  is the mean of the series 
(Galí et al. 2004). With  we denote the seasonally adjusted annual growth rate of the 
monetary aggregate M3 (Source: ECB) averaged over the last three months. The yearly 
growth rate of the exchange rate is based on the real CPI effective exchange rate index (EER-
42, Source: ECB). 
mΔ
We employ our wording indicator lagged one month wt-1 as a proxy for . Thus, the 
explanatory value of this indicator is to reveal the extent to which rhetoric signals contain 
information about the monetary decision process which is not included in the standard Taylor 
approach variables. 
O
tiΔ
Using the wording indicator we face the problem that not every month has seen an ECB press 
conference and sometimes there were two of these events in one month. We treat the missing 
value problem by evaluating the editorial of the Monthly Bulletin instead. The double values 
are replaced by their respective average. 
Table 5 shows descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables. The maximum interest rate 
steps are ±0.5 percentage points. The economic sentiment indicator esi displays the highest 
variance closely followed by the exchange rate variable. 
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Table 5: The used time series span from 1999:1 to 2005:5 has 74 observations in each 
series.  
 i iΔ  π  y  esi mΔ eΔ  WID WI9900 
Mean 3.03 0.99 2.02 0.01 0.13 6.22 1.23 0.08 -0.47 
Median 3.00 1.00 2.10 -0.14 -1.07 5.93 2.00 -0.15 -0.50 
Maximum 4.75 2.00 3.10 2.67 14.74 8.70 15.99 3.59 2.90 
Minimum 2.00 0.00 0.80 -2.62 -12.83 3.80 -13.95 -1.95 -4.97 
Std. Dev. 0.94 0.45 0.46 1.14 7.74 1.32 7.72 1.20 1.81 
 
As standard in Taylor regressions we expect the following signs: a higher inflation rate should 
lead to a higher probability of an interest rate increase. The same holds for the output gap, the 
economic sentiment and money growth. The lagged change of the interest rate is to reveal 
smoothing behaviour. A positive growth rate of the exchange rate means an appreciation of 
the Euro vis-à-vis the rest of the world. This would reduce the risk of inflation and the 
probability of an interest rate cut would rise. Last but not least, the wording indicator should 
show a positive sign since a high indicator value signals a large extent of “hawkishness” 
leading to a higher probability of an interest rate increase. 
According to our testing strategy described in section 2 we estimate basically three variants of 
a model explaining ECB interest rate changes. Our baseline model is a standard Taylor 
approach. We contrast this first to both a “naïve” central bank watcher model where no 
information is used but wording and the interest rate’s history and second to a Taylor equation 
augmented by the wording index.  
We apply this testing strategy to two periods with the different wording indicators described 
above in order to supply both within and out of sample insights. The first set of regressions 
(Table 6) represents a within sample approach: The Duisenberg era wording indicator (WID) 
is used to explain interest rate decisions which have been used to construct this indicator. The 
second set of regressions (Table 7) is an out of sample exercise: The wording indicator 
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employed (WI9900) was constructed on the basis of information from periods (1999-2000) not 
included in the estimation period (2001:01 – 2005:03). It thus can be interpreted to represent 
the following sequence of learning: The first two years of the newly established central bank 
are used by ECB watchers to learn about the meaning of code words. Subsequently, this new 
knowledge is available to improve predictability of interest rate decisions. Although being the 
superior approach judging on methodological considerations, the second set of regressions 
suffers from a loss of observations excluding all cases of increasing interest rates from the 
analysis.  
Our baseline regressions are presented in columns (1) and (4) where μ1 and μ2 denote the 
estimated thresholds separating the categories (in estimation equation (4) only one threshold 
exists since the covered period does not include any increases in interest rates). Estimations 
using the output gap as an alternative to the economic sentiment indicator are contained in the 
appendix (table B). For the full sample (1), all explanatory variables included in the Taylor 
approach are significant, at least at the 10 percent level. For the second time period, this 
specification does not give reasonable results. Therefore, we rely on the basic Taylor 
specification including only the lagged interest rate, change of the interest rate, inflation rate 
and economic sentiment indicator. In this restricted regression (4), apart from the lagged 
interest rate only the economic sentiment indicator appears to be significant.  
 
Table 6: Coefficients of the ordered probit estimation (z-statistic in brackets)  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Adjusted sample 1999:3 – 2005:4 
it-1 
-1.31** 
(-2.26) 
-0.34* 
(-1.70) 
-1.60** 
(-2.05) 
1ti −Δ  -2.96
* 
(-1.78)  
-4.22** 
(-2.19) 
1tπ −  1.65
** 
(2.03)  
1.20 
(1.32) 
esit-1 
0.26*** 
(2.59)  
0.19* 
(1.74) 
1tm −Δ  1.13
*** 
(2.65)  
1.01** 
(2.48) 
1te −Δ  -0.21
*** 
(-2.70)  
-0.24*** 
(-2.59) 
WID,t-1  
0.72*** 
(3.85) 
0.81** 
(2.06) 
μ1 3.42 (0.99) 
-2.57*** 
(3.52) 
0.45 
(0.11) 
μ2 9.24
** 
(2.45) 
0.78 
(1.32) 
7.50** 
(2.00) 
Log likelihood -22.81 -37.54 -20.21 
Restr. log 
likelihood -47.67 
Pseudo R2 0.5215 0.2125 0.5761 
Significance at the 1 (***), 5 (**), 10 (*) per cent level 
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Table 7: Coefficients of the ordered probit estimation (z-statistic in brackets) 
 (4) (5) (6) 
Adjusted sample 2001:1 – 2005:4 
it-1 
-1.82** 
(-1.99) 
-0.77** 
(-2.34) 
-3.36** 
(-2.10) 
1ti −Δ  -3.27 (-1.33)  
-13.21** 
(-1.98) 
1tπ −  -0.27 (-0.24)  
-5.04 
(-1.64) 
esit-1 
0.22** 
(2.10)  
0.20 
(1.54) 
WI9900,t-1 
 
 
0.39* 
(1.78) 
2.28* 
(1.82) 
μ -8.67
** 
(-2.28) 
-4.00*** 
(-3.02) 
-27.11** 
(-2.09) 
Log likelihood -13.28 -16.04 -9.66 
Restr. log 
likelyhood -20.54 
Pseudo R2 0.3535 0.2193 0.5297 
Significance at the 1 (***), 5 (**), 10 (*) per cent level 
 
The naïve regressions (2) and (5) based solely on the wording indicator and past values of the 
interest rates show a poorer fit compared to the Taylor specification (1) and (4). Even though 
the wording indicator is significant in both approaches, it cannot fully substitute the more 
thorough economic modelling. 
21 
Regressions (3) and (6) test for the informative added value of ECB rhetoric by augmenting 
the Taylor specification by our wording indicators. This indicator turns out to be significant in 
the within sample regression as well as in the out of sample regression at the 5 or 10 per cent 
level. The regressions’ fits increase with the inclusion of the wording indicators; the 
improvement is particularly marked for the out of sample analysis (as can be seen from a 
comparison of (6) with (4)). But for the within sample estimation, the wording indicator 
seems to replace the inflation rate. As the ECB stresses that its foremost objective is achieving 
price level stability, this estimation result could hint for the reflection of the objective in the 
rhetoric. Because the ECB cares so much about inflation, its wording can replace the inflation 
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rate in the estimation. For the out of sample analysis, both basis variables, the inflation rate 
and the economic sentiment are not significant anymore.  Nevertheless, their inclusion 
improves the value of the log likelihood considerably as the comparison between estimation 
(5) and (6) shows. 
To assess the influence of the variables on the probability of an interest rate decrease, increase 
or of an unchanged interest rate, the marginal effects of the variables are evaluated at their 
mean and displayed in Table 8. For some of the variables the sum of the probabilities does not 
add to zero because of truncation effects.  
If the mean of the wording indicator increases by one point, this would lead to a decrease in 
the probability of an interest rate cut by 0.002 and to an increase in the probability of an 
unchanged interest rate or increasing interest rate by 0.001 or 0.0002, respectively, for model 
(3). Thus, the size of the marginal effect of the wording indicator is comparable to that of the 
inflation rate, money growth or the lagged interest rate. The influence growth rate of the 
exchange rate is even lower. The high degree of interest rate smoothing reported in other 
studies (e.g. Fourçans and Vranceanu 2004) is apparent in these equations, too. The lagged 
change of the target interest rate has the largest effect on the probabilities. A large interest rate 
step last month is not followed by an even larger step but rather by an unchanged or falling 
rate, the probability of an interest rate cut rises. 
 
Table 8: Marginal effects of change in mean of the explanatory variable  
Change of probability of 
interest rate decrease unchanged interest rate interest rate increase 
Prob(y=0) Prob(y=1) Prob(y=2) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
i 0.012 0.037 0.003 -0.007 -0.007 -0.003 -0.005 -0.030 -0.000 
iΔ  0.027  0.008 -0.016  -0.008 -0.011  -0.001 
π  -0.015  -0.002 0.009  0.002 0.006  0.000 
esi -0.002  -0.000 0.001  0.000 0.001  0.000 
mΔ  -0.010  -0.002 0.006  0.002 0.004  0.000 
eΔ  0.002  0.001 -0.001  -0.000 -0.001  0.000 
w  -0,078 -0.002  0.015 0.001  0.063 0.000 
 
To evaluate whether the prediction of interest rate changes differs from the basic equation if 
the wording indicator is included, refer to Table 9, which displays the prediction of policy rate 
changes for the different models. By including the wording indicator into the Taylor equation, 
the error predicting interest changes decreases by forecasting fewer points with unchanged 
interest rates in favour of the two other categories. Especially the forecast of interest rate 
increases improves. Again the poor performance of the naïve approach (2) becomes apparent 
with virtually no discriminatory power between different monetary phases. 
 
Table 9: Prediction of interest rate changes. 
Counts of observations with 
maximum probability 
Error  Count 
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
0iΔ <  8 2 0 4 6 8 4 
0iΔ =  59 68 74 64 -9 -15 -5 
0iΔ >  7 4 0 6 3 7 1 
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5 Conclusions 
In this paper’s title we pose the question „does it pay to watch central bankers’ lips”? Judging 
on the experience with the ECB we answer this question in the affirmative. Compared to 
technical approaches based on standard Taylor equations and solely hard economic data the 
exploitation of rhetoric signals can be helpful to better explain what the central bank is doing. 
This result is confirmed on the basis of out of sample analysis where the period on which the 
wording indicator’s choice of weights is based is not included in testing this indicator’s 
significance. Thus, we tend to accept the hypothesis that wording includes information helpful 
to improve the explanation of interest rate decisions based on standard explanatory models. 
This also indicates that Taylor regressions are not able to capture the realities of monetary 
policy completely – a fact which seems sometimes to be ignored in the literature. 
It should be stressed that our wording indicator based on statistical reasoning is nevertheless 
rather mechanical and only an approximation for the information content of wording. It 
cannot capture the art of reading between the lines of central bankers’ statements. In this 
sense our results for the informative contents of wording must be regarded to be of a 
conservative nature. 
Although our analysis hints to the usefulness of rhetoric signals it also indicates its limitation. 
Market participants benefiting from a correct prediction of monetary decisions are well 
advised to employ also more rigorous models for their forecasts in addition to listening to 
ECB press conferences. Our findings largely indicate that judgements based solely on 
analysing central bankers’ speeches are inferior to more refined approaches based on models 
and economic data. 
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Appendix 
Table A: Potential code words with examples of use 
Code word Examples 
“appropriate” The Governing Council concluded that the information 
which had become available in recent weeks confirmed that 
the current level of key ECB interest rates remains 
appropriate for the maintenance of price stability over the 
medium term  (7 March 2002). 
 
Overall, the current monetary policy stance remains 
appropriate to preserve a favourable outlook for price 
stability in the medium term (6 February 2003). 
We judge the current monetary policy stance appropriate to 
maintain a favourable outlook for price stability in the 
medium term. Hence, we have decided to keep our key rates 
unchanged (9 January 2003). 
“in line with price stability” On the basis of our regular economic and monetary analysis, 
we have not changed our assessment that the current stance 
of monetary policy remains in line with the maintenance of 
price stability over the medium term (1 April 2004). 
 
In summary, the economic analysis indicates that the main 
scenario for price developments in the medium term 
continues to be in line with our definition of price stability 
(4 December 2003). 
 
“for the time being” To sum up, the economic analysis continues to indicate that 
the main scenario for price developments in the coming 
years is in line with price stability. Cross-checking with the 
monetary analysis does not alter this picture for the time 
being (4 March 2004). 
 
For the time being, we thus see a confirmation of our 
earlier assessment, which led us to reduce the key ECB 
interest rates by 50 basis points on 17 September. In fact, 
the recent events strengthened tendencies towards lower 
rates of inflation that were already prevailing before (11 
October 2001). 
“observe” Over the coming months, volatility in annual inflation rates 
is likely to be observed, mainly due to further base effects 
from energy prices as well as to increases in indirect taxes (4 
March 2004). 
 
As I have already noted on previous occasions, the rise in 
the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) which we 
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have observed over recent months stems, to a large extent, 
from the combined effects of both oil price and exchange 
rate developments (13 April 2000). 
“monitor” The Governing Council will carefully monitor future 
developments and assess whether conditions for price 
stability continue to develop favourably (8 May 2003).  
 
In view of the high uncertainty on future growth, and its 
implication for medium-term inflationary developments, the 
Governing Council has discussed extensively the arguments 
for and against a cut in the key ECB interest rates. The view 
has prevailed to keep interest rates unchanged. However, the 
Governing Council will monitor closely the downside risks 
to economic growth in the euro area (7 November 2002).  
 
As always, we will continue to monitor carefully all 
developments that could affect our assessment of risks to 
price stability over the medium term (6 May 2004). 
“vigilant”/”vigilance” The Eurosystem will remain vigilant in assessing upside 
risks to price stability and will take appropriate action if and 
when required (13 April 2000). 
 
The Governing Council will remain vigilant with regard to 
all developments which could affect the risks to price 
stability over the medium term (1 July 2004). 
“risks to price stability” We will remain vigilant with regard to all developments 
which could affect the risks to price stability over the 
medium term (4 June 2004). 
 
As always, we will continue to monitor carefully all 
developments that could affect our assessment of risks to 
price stability over the medium term (6 May 2004). 
“upside/upward risks to price 
stability” 
To sum up, annual inflation rates should fall below 2% in 
2005, but a number of medium-term upside risks to price 
stability need to be carefully monitored (7 October 2004). 
“upside/upward pressure on 
inflation” 
Over the short term, oil prices continue to exert upward 
pressure on the general price level (1 July 2004). 
 
Due to the increase in oil prices, some renewed upward 
pressure on consumer prices is likely to have emerged 
around the turn of the year (9 January 2003). 
 
I noted earlier that, from a monetary policy point of view, 
these developments are a cause for concern as they add to 
the upward pressure on consumer prices in the euro area 
(14 September 2000). 
“downside/downward risks to 
growth/economic activity” 
Overall, with regard to the cyclical situation, recent data 
confirm our earlier expectations that there are still downside 
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risks for output growth (4 March 1999). 
 
Sources of downside risks – including oil prices, 
imbalances in the global economy, financial market 
uncertainties and their impact on consumption, investment, 
and thus on employment – will be monitored closely (10 
October 2002). 
“second round effects” These risks relate mainly to oil price developments and their 
potential to lead to second-round effects stemming from 
wage and price-setting behaviour (7 July 2005). 
 
Inflation rates are now approaching higher levels than 
expected earlier, and larger and more protracted commodity 
and producer price increases are heightening the risk of 
second round effects (3 February 2000). 
“appropriate action” The Eurosystem will remain vigilant in assessing upside 
risks to price stability and will take appropriate action if 
and when required (13 April 2000). 
“alert” The Governing Council will continue to remain alert to 
emerging risks to price stability (14 September 2000). 
“mixed signals” Recent data and survey indicators on economic activity have 
been mixed. In general they point to ongoing economic 
growth at a moderate pace over the short term, with no clear 
signs as yet of a strengthening in underlying dynamics (7 
April 2005). 
 
Our conclusion was that while risks to price stability over 
the medium term remain tilted to the upside, recent evidence 
sends mixed signals (4 July 2002). 
“favourable outlook for 
growth” 
Reflecting favourable domestic and external conditions for 
growth, the outlook for euro area growth continues to be 
positive (6 July 2000). 
 
The more favourable expectations for economic 
development in the euro area are partly connected with a 
further improved outlook for the world economy (7 October 
1999). 
“favourable outlook for price 
stability” 
Overall, the Governing Council confirmed its previous 
assessment of a favourable outlook for price stability in 
the euro area over the medium term (4 March 2004). 
 
We judge the current monetary policy stance appropriate to 
maintain a favourable outlook for price stability in the 
medium term (9 January 2003). 
“compatible/consistent with 
price stability” 
Overall, as several indicators are pointing to an abatement of 
inflationary pressures, the new level of interest rates is 
compatible with the maintenance of price stability over 
the medium term (30 August 2001). 
 
Markets still expect an evolution of consumer prices, which 
will remain compatible with price stability (9 September 
1999). 
“balanced” Our conclusion is that risks to price stability are at present 
balanced (10 October 2002). 
 
The decision to keep interest rates unchanged reflects the 
Governing Council's assessment that the risks to price 
stability in the medium term now appear more balanced 
than at the end of last year (1 February 2001). 
“economic slowdown” First, when looking back, we recognise that inflation has 
been rather persistent despite the economic slowdown (5 
December 2002). 
 
First, the slowdown in economic activity which I just 
mentioned may contribute to containing inflationary 
pressure stemming from the labour market (30 August 
2001). 
number of words  
 
Table B: Estimations using the output gap 
 (A1) (A2) (A3) (A4) 
Adjusted sample 1999:3 – 2005:4 2001:1 – 2005:4 
it-1 -1.20** 
(-2.22) 
-1.64** 
(-2.18) 
-1.40** 
(-2.30) 
-2.49** 
(-2.16) 
1ti −Δ  -1.35 
(-0.99) 
-2.95* 
(-1.76) 
-2.15 
(-1.10) 
-9.81* 
(-1.79) 
1tπ −  -0.08 
(-0.12) 
-0.19 
(-0.27) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
-3.74 
(1.35) 
yt-1 0.82** 
(2.55) 
0.69** 
(2.03) 
1.00** 
(2.36) 
0.73 
(1.47) 
1tm −Δ  0.70** 
(2.19) 
0.69** 
(2.13) 
  
1te −Δ  -0.31*** 
(3.79) 
-0.32*** 
(-3.34) 
  
WID,t-1  0.93** 
(2.36) 
  
WI9900,t-1    1.84 
(1.63) 
μ1 -2.57 
(-0.86) 
-4.81 
(-1.20) 
-5.72** 
(2.21) 
-19.94* 
(1.89) 
μ2 3.23 
(1.20) 
2.63 
(0.86) 
  
Log likelihood -22.95 -19.47 -13.45 -10.06 
Restr. log 
likelyhood 
-47.67 -20.54 
Pseudo R2 0.5186 0.5916 0.3452 0.5105 
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